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His doctrine is that though the moral law applies to politics as well as to all other human activities, yet the moral principles applicable to politics are entirely different from those of private life. "Politics," he says, "as all human action, is subject to the authority of moral duty, but the moral law which prescribes virtues and duties for the individual is not available in the conduct of public affairs" (p. 48). And again: "Moreover, how can the golden rule be applied to the relation of one state to another? None of the ties which bind man to man can join state to state" (p. 34). He then goes on to argue that though the state is founded on the very idea of justice, yet the ordinary principles of justice do not apply to the conduct of the state itself. Such doctrines, I confess, seem to me nothing less than immoral. Of course, the whole moral law is not applicable to politics, because the state does not cover the whole field of the moral life; it exists for certain purposes only, the chief of which is the maintenance of justice. But, so far as the activity of the state extends, it is just as much under the control of moral principles as the individual is, and the principles in both cases are the same.

Mr. Holls, however, evidently agrees with the author's views, for he quotes largely from an address by Lord Lytton in which he lays down the same doctrines as those of Ruemelin. Lytton says: "Of the class of obligations which constitute private morals, only one, namely, justice, has a place in public morals, and the sort of justice which finds its place in public morals is totally different from the justice which relates to individuals" (p. 111). Such doctrines are repugnant to every unbiased conscience; and I believe that the best men will concur in a remark by the late Edward J. Phelps which is quoted in this book, that the foreign policy of America "should have for its basis the opposite of the theory set forth by Lord Lytton. It should be founded in the highest morality and justice; it should prefer the right to the expedient, or rather should find in the right what is always in the end the expedient."

JAMES B. PETERSON.

The Origins of Art: A Psychological and Sociological Inquiry. By YRJÖ HIRN. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1900.—pp. xi, 327.

This important book is a delightfully definite, clear, and psychologically sound treatise on a subject in whose discussion the qualities just named have been sufficiently rare. Its problem is distinctly stated at the outset to be the investigation of the reason why works of art are created, not why they are enjoyed; and the author further discriminates between the utilitarian factors that have coöperated to produce works of art in the history of the race, and the art-impulse proper. His account of the psychological nature of this impulse is as follows: Every emotion tends to manifest itself in actions, which enhance its pleasure if it be pleasant and relieve its pain if it be painful, since activity is accompanied by pleasure and inhibition by pain. Out of this general tendency to active emotional expression the art-impulse grows through the introduction of a social factor:

the individual desire that others shall share his emotion, in order, primitively, that his own relieving or enhancing activities may be further stimulated by the sight of similar manifestation in others. "The work of art presents itself as the most effective means by which the individual is enabled to convey to wider and wider circles of sympathizers an emotional state similar to that by which he is himself dominated." The intrinsic features of all forms of artistic expression will then have this characteristic : they will be selected because of their fitness to propagate the artist's emotional state in the minds of others. Rhythm favors emotional contagion by its hold on the attention ; dramatic representation, of course, through the tendency to imitate ; sensuous beauty, again, by predisposing the attention favorably. The work of art acquires certain intellectual qualities, because in many cases the emotion cannot be transmitted to an outsider without, in the author's phrase, "accounting for it to his intellect" ; and also because the transmission requires the focusing of attention on certain aspects or elements.

Such is, in outline, Professor Hirn's account of the origin of the pure art impulse. It will be noticed that he has made sensuous beauty a subordinate element introduced merely to conciliate the attention. He objects strongly to "the fatal confusion between art theory and the science of beauty" which has led Mr. Marshall, for example, to derive art from an impulse "to produce objects or objective conditions which should attract by pleasing ;" and Professor Baldwin to speak of "self-exhibition" as a mainspring of the art impulse. The author's theory is that the artist attracts only to communicate. His objection to the term "self-exhibition," by the way, is not the one we should expect from him. He says: "It seems somewhat difficult to make this self-exhibiting—in a sense that implies an actual audience—the aim and purpose of, for instance, the most intimate and personal examples of lyrical poetry." Surely the term does not imply an actual audience any more than Professor Hirn's social theory of art does, and the latter requires reference to an imaginary audience as well for lyrical poetry as for any other form of art. The real difference between the two is that Professor Baldwin like Mr. Marshall makes the artist's main purpose the commending of himself to his audience, whereas for Professor Hirn the commending is secondary to the communication of emotion.

The relation of the author's theory to the intellectualistic view of art is also interesting. The fact, that in seeking to present the aspect or quality of a thing which shall best transmit the artist's emotional state, and by which he often hits upon that which best represents the thing's essential nature, has led, we are told, to the error of supposing that it is the province of art to represent the essential qualities of things.

In the second part of the book the writer turns from the psychological to the historical point of view, and investigates the part played in the concrete development of art by the various utilitarian motives involved in the com-

munication of information, in the making of historical records, in work, war, love, and magic. Especially full and careful is the discussion of the function of sexual selection in the development of art. Everywhere the distinction is carefully drawn between the pure art impulse, as Professor Hirn conceives it, and all other coöperating factors. He has certainly demonstrated that the desire to communicate emotion is fundamental in the psychology of art. Whether it is the sole element in the art impulse, or whether the desire to commend oneself by producing what is sensuously beautiful may not be coördinate with it, is largely a question of definition.

MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN.

The Child: A Study in the Evolution of Man. By ALEXANDER FRANCIS CHAMBERLAIN. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900.—pp. xii, 498.

Professor Chamberlain's work is, as the sub-title indicates, not a record of child study as such, but a treatise on the development of the child in its phylogenetic significance. The heading of one of the chapters, "The Child as Revealer of the Past" is applicable in a sense to all of them; throughout, the comparison is constantly drawn between the child and primitive man. The author's aim has been to collect statements and theories from a wide range of authorities and to present them mostly in the form of direct quotations. This method guards, he thinks, against the possibility of his misinterpreting the views of others; but it is a question whether he has not carried it to such excess as to give the contents of the book a somewhat undigested and bewildering look. Nevertheless, the book is a compendium of much information that would otherwise be widely scattered.

MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN.

Robert Mayers Auffassung des Causalprinzips und Begründung des Prinzips von der Erhaltung der Energie. Von J. W. A. HICKSON. Halle, 1900.—pp. 48.

This is a doctor's thesis presented to the University of Halle. In it the author shows, as Riehl has already done in his *Philosophischer Kriticismus* and in a recent article published in the *Sigwart Festschrift*, that Mayer arrived at the principle of the conservation energy by deducing it logically from the proposition: "A quantity, which arises from nothing, cannot be annihilated"; that is, from nothing nothing comes, and nothing goes into nothing. Hence every change must have its cause, and the effect must be equal to the cause. If the effect were, quantitatively considered, greater than the cause, something would arise out of nothing. It follows from this that the cause itself passes over entirely into the effect. Mayer also developed a satisfactory notion of force or energy. Force is something expended in the production of motion, it is mechanical work, a body's capacity for work. Forces are causes of changes. There is in